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Abstract  
This  paper  offers  an  appraisal  of  the  relationship  between  sociology  and
philosophy grounded in a critique of the former discipline’s failure to contend
with the dominance of neoliberalism in the run up to the financial crisis. In the
first instance, it considers the prevailing philosophical ethos after the end of the
Cold  War  and  what  Francis  Fukuyama  (1992)  called  the  ‘End  of  History’.  It
observes the emergence of an increasingly unchallenged political monad around
the conjoined principles of liberal democracy and neoliberal economics and its
ascendance  to  the  status  of  socio-historical  universality  despite  becoming
increasingly problematic. The second half of the essay then carries this political-
philosophical  analysis  into  an  exploration  of  contemporary  sociology  and  its
approach  to  the  intellectual  critique  of  dominant  ideas  and  structures.  It
proposes that an emergent strain of philosophical relativism has inadvertently
moved  us  away  from  some  of  the  critical  responsibilities  of  the  traditional
intellectual  and  eroded  our  capacity  to  offer  practical  alternatives  to
overwhelmingly neoliberal governance. The article ends on the hopeful note that
a  slight  change in  tack  might  push us  toward  reclaiming responsibilities  and
revitalising the debate on social transformation.   
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Introduction
On Sunday 12 October 2008, Alistair Darling, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
left the Washington headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
boarded  a  flight  back  to  London.  Darling’s  experience  of  his  otherwise
unremarkable business class flight, however, was marred by external turbulences
of  which  few  of  his  fellow  passengers  would  have  been  aware.  The  City  of
London,  the  financial  bedrock  of  the  British economy,  was in  trouble  and  an
implosion to rival the 1930s was well and truly on the cards. Unless a plan could
be finalized before markets reopened the following morning the public  might
have  headed  out  to  work  to  find  cash  points  inoperable,  credit/debit  cards
unusable and the whole economy facing a terminal collapse of its monetary base.
Hours from disaster, the highest echelons of government convened in a bid to
prevent capitalism reaching crisis point. Less than a year after Northern Rock’s
nationalization, the rest of the financial sector was staring down the same surfeit
of ‘bad debt’. Once again, the state would have to step in. To do nothing risked
wholesale economic collapse and everything that implies – national bankruptcy,
mass social unrest, economic shockwaves pulsating over Europe and the rest of
the  world  and  perhaps  even  irreparable  damage  to  the  public  standing  of
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neoliberal  capitalism  itself.  The  following  morning,  only  hours  after  arriving
home, the Chancellor stood grave and haggard beside the Prime Minister. With all
the  resigned  solemnity  of  a  declaration  of  war  the  British  state  declared  its
intention to do everything in  its  power to buttress financial  capitalism in the
name of ‘businesses, working families and home-owners’ (BBC News, 2008). 
For  decades  prior  to  this  financial  impasse  we  had  been  told  that  business,
including international finance, should be given as much freedom as possible and
that the only way to ensure future prosperity was to legislate for a libertarian,
light touch approach to economic regulation (Chang, 2010). This represented the
fundamental  neoliberal  economic  principles  that  politicians  of  all  parties  had
stood for since 1979. For three decades our political leaders have stood for ‘the
freedom of private firms to seek profit in any way they could’ (Wallerstein, 2011:
6) and the undesirability of state regulation unless it aids the functioning of free
markets  (Harvey,  2005).  This  ‘economic  liberalism’  was,  and  remains,  the
linchpin of British politics: an unimpeachable truth, without question the best
way to organise an economy, a system that seemed somehow connected to all the
utopian  imaginings  of  classical  liberalism;  the  rational  economic  actor,
unencumbered by state interference, driving the economy forward with his/her
entrepreneurial  dynamism  and  thirst  for  profit.  In  little  else  have  we  more
earnest  faith  than  concepts  such  as  ‘innovation’,  ‘entrepreneurialism’  and
‘economic  growth’   (Deutschmann,  2001).  Indeed,  the  political  class  was  so
convinced of the moral rectitude of economic liberalism that Francis Fukuyama
(1992),  along  with  many  of  his  contemporaries,  drew  the  conclusion  that  it
represented the end point of our philosophical development. It was to be the ‘end
of history’, the ‘final form of human government’. 
Ultimately, this might appear to be a conviction that ‘politics’,  the ‘art of living
together  and…  search[ing]  for  the  common  good’  (Rancière,  2005:  23),  has
fulfilled its promise and must now turn its hand to preserving and administering
neoliberalism’s high-water mark. Consequently, any sense of political bipolarity
seems to have fallen away to be replaced by a political culture that sees its role
extending no further than technocratic stewardship (Žižek, 2010). In this context,
the purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to examine in a little more detail the
political and philosophical tenor of liberal society at the ‘end of history’ and then
to look at how recent directions in sociological theory might be related to late-
twentieth century political monism.
Liberal Universalism
The starting point for this paper is a widely acknowledged development in the
political  outlook of  much of  the  industrialized world  since  the late  nineteen-
eighties.  Slowly  but  surely  competing  discourses  of  political  economy  were
replaced by the dominant,  absolutely hegemonic  neoliberalism at  Fukuyama’s
‘end  of  history’.  Progressive  ideals,  fundamental  ideological  oppositions  and
attempts to transform human conditions gave way to ‘the end point of mankind’s
ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as
the final form of human government’ (1992: 4). 
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According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), capitalism has become an entirely
different  beast  over  the  last  few  decades;  seamlessly  combining  increasingly
polarized social  relations with rhetorical  devices  traditionally  associated with
various  forms  of  progressivism  (liberty,  justice  and  fairness).  Allied  to  this
process was the willingness of much of the left to eschew traditional narratives
(class struggle, collectivism and injustice) in favor of the politics of possessive
individualism and private identities. ‘Liberty’, once associated with the struggle
against  overt  repressive  domination,  has  been  recast  as  ‘liberation  [that]  is
predominantly conceived as setting free the oppressed desire… to be who one
wants  to  be,  when  one  wants  it’  (Ibid.  434).  This  liberty  to  pursue  hedonic
desires is far less inimical to capitalism than traditional conceptions of human
freedom. More than that, however, it also constitutes a fundamental redefinition
of  what  it  means  to  be  ‘free’,  placing  much  more  emphasis  on  the  many
individualized opportunities  afforded by neoliberal  capitalism and far  less  on
collective action and ‘the common good’. In this sense, we have arguably reached
a  new  form  of  capitalism  which,  rather  than  exercising  power  in  overtly
oppressive ways, ‘enchant[s] its subjects with dreams (of freedom, of how your
success depends on yourself, of the run of luck which is just around the corner, of
unconstrained pleasures…)’ (Žižek, 2009: 26) thus facilitating internalisation of
the most capital-friendly socio-economic conditions and broad acquiescence to
its various necessities even where we might point to a number of serious flaws. 
While  a  more detailed discussion of  neoliberal  trajectories would perhaps be
desirable it is sadly beyond the bounds of this paper. The crucial point to carry
forward is that this ‘new spirit of capitalism’, otherwise known as neoliberalism,
has largely succeeded in realigning much of our social outlook with the needs of
unfettered capital accumulation. Traditional Protestant values such as saving and
frugality, for instance, hold little profitability for an economic system based on all
manner of complex financial operations (including the practice of ‘securitization’,
which  involves  packaging  and  reselling  debts  on  the  international  money
markets, [see Ferguson, 2008]) and consumer culture. The rise of neoliberalism,
however,  was accompanied by an individualist  ethos of  personal  solipsism in
which the ubiquitous opportunity to ‘buy now – pay later’ kicked off the upward
progression  of  outstanding  consumer  debt  that  very  nearly  finished  off  our
economy. What is more, despite applying downward pressure to wages, widening
the gap between rich and poor and relying heavily on a ready supply of easily
obtained credit,  neoliberalism looked inordinately successful  until  its  fortunes
took a downward turn with the beginning of the ‘credit crunch’. For all intents
and  purposes,  it  appeared  to  usher  in  an  era  of  low  unemployment,  steady
growth,  relative  stability  and  generalized  prosperity  (see  Elliott  &  Atkinson,
2007; Toynbee & Walker, 2010) that further served to legitimize neoliberalism in
the  eyes  of  the  general  population.  This  apparent  success  contributed  to  the
belief structure that is the subject of this essay – that neoliberalism can provide
for all of our needs and that a ‘single economic and political system… [is] coming
into being throughout the world’ (Gray, 2007: 104). Neoliberalism and utopian
liberal democracy now occupy the space left by radical, progressive narratives
and the possibility of a better world.
3
The structure of human society at the ‘end of history’ appears to have become a
one  horse  race  in  which  all  the  other  runners  fell  at  early  fences  by  not
sufficiently distancing themselves from totalitarianism and revolutionary change.
It seemed that to strive for radical social change was inevitably to fail – in such
circumstance neoliberalism seemed the safest bet.  Alain Badiou has described
this as a ‘conviction that to want something better is to want something worse’
(2010:  1),  which  has  significantly  bolstered  neoliberalism  and  its  emergent
position as the only decent, humanistic social order available to mankind. In this
vein,  neoliberal  ideologues  have  often  claimed  that  liberal  economic  theory
‘provided a mode of seeing and a way of organizing the world that could diagnose
a  country’s  fundamental  condition,  frame  the  terms  of  its  public  debate,  and
propose remedies for its improvement’ (Mitchell, 2007: 1) all in ways that would
not conflict with the competitiveness and self-interest that they often assume
innate to our species. Again according to Badiou:
Depending on what moment we examine, the [twentieth] century appears to
operate on one of two maxims: one, (operative today, for example) calls for
renunciation, resignation, the lesser evil, together with moderation, the end
of humanity as a spiritual force and the critique of ‘grand narratives’. The
other – which dominated the ‘short century’ between 1917 and the 1980s –
inherits… the will  to ‘break the history of the world in two’,  and seeks a
radical  commencement  that  would  bear  within  it  the  foundations  of  a
reconciled humanity (2007: 31). 
This marked socio-historical shift  remains absolutely crucial  to understanding
our current social predicament. In place of the will to split world history that
made  the  twentieth  century  such  an  Age  of  Extremes (Hobsbawm,  1995),  of
radical political movements and myriad social innovations, recent decades have
been characterized more by renunciation of revolutionary change followed by
retreat toward socio-economic liberalism. We have experimented with putting
ever  more  of  the  commons  back  into  private  hands,  tried  scaling  back  labor
protection and removing constraints from international finance and placing great
faith in (neo-)liberal economic principles that have undoubtedly proved flawed
on many previous occasions (see Mackay, 1852; Galbraith, 1994; Kindleberger,
2000;  Reinhart  &  Rogoff,  2009).  In  the  space  of  three  decades  we  all  but
disavowed  the  gains  made  during  the  decades  of  the  social  democratic
settlement after World War Two and reinstituted the preceding classical liberal
order  in  response  to  nineteen-seventies  economic  stagnation  (Frieden,  2006)
and  the  claims  made  by  politicians  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  that
neoliberalism could deliver us safe from turbulent seas.
Neoliberalism  may  well  be  ‘sufficiently  productive  enough  to  be  generally
accepted’  (Gray,  2007:  113)  and  opening  economic  borders  has  undoubtedly
allowed more people to participate in trade (Sorman, 2009).  Yet as much as it
appears ‘more tolerant – unbothered about ‘family values’, no longer pervasively
homophobic,  less  deeply  racist  and… not  so  fixated  on issues  of  class’  (Gray,
2007: 114) there are a host of demerits that must also be mentioned. Ours is a
society that appears to be rapidly becoming more unjust, insecure and unequal
(Elliot & Atkinson, 1998; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009; Dorling, 2010; Hutton, 2010;
Southwood,  2011),  increasingly debt-ridden (Pettifor,  2006;  Elliot  & Atkinson,
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2007; Langley, 2009; Harvey, 2010), with a dislocated population prone to signs
of  stress,  anxiety  and  depression  (Lane,  2000;  Schumaker,  2006;  Freeman  &
Freeman,  2008).  Internationally,  neoliberalism  appears  even  more  suspect,
implicated in similar atrocities to those often thought constitutive of progressive
collectivist regimes. It has, for instance, a terrifying propensity for aiding despots
and dictators when their continued power serves its interests (Johnson, 2002;
Kinzer, 2003; Pilger, 2007), and a habit of interfering in foreign sovereignty for
the  same  reasons  whilst  promoting  an  economic  system  prone  to
institutionalized  instabilities  and  atrocities  of  its  own  (see  Chomsky,  2004;
Bakan, 2005; Losurdo, 2011).
Nowhere,  however,  is neoliberalism subjected to the same level of  skepticism,
apprehension and outright revulsion as more collectivist alternatives. Cambodian
killing fields,  the Holocaust,  purges,  pogroms, gulags and the Chinese Cultural
Revolution  are  trotted  out  at  the  slightest  provocation  by  defenders  of
neoliberalism while our war crimes, environmental negligence and disregard for
foreign human life are acknowledged only in passing. Without getting embroiled
in  the  interminable  argument  over  the  most  murderous  ideology,  it  should
immediately  be  noted  that  the  historical  character  of  leftist  progressivism
appears to rest on its many failures but not its successes while neoliberalism’s
reputation appears  to  rest  on a  few limited successes.  Yet  in  Britain and the
United States, not to mention Continental Europe, the Social Democratic era was
anything but a failure. In fact, it was a ‘golden age of capitalism’ in which long-
term economic stability and sustained growth (Arrighi, 2010; Callinicos, 2010;
Wolf, 2010) combined with dramatic social innovations that went a long way to
improving  everyday  life.  Funded  by  highly  progressive  taxation  the  Social
Democratic state ploughed revenue into welfare programs that smoothed over
some of the ingrained social  inequalities generated by pre-war ‘neoclassicism’
(the philosophical  antecedent of  our ‘neoliberalism’) whilst  improving general
security and quality of life for industrial populations (Standing, 2011). Still, the
failures of leftist collectivism are seen to be inevitable but those of neoliberalism
are only episodic lapses,  certainly nothing that should stop it  getting just one
more bite  of  the cherry.  This,  according to Alain Badiou,  is  the foundation of
current political orthodoxy in the developed, liberal west:
‘[W]e have here, almost unchanged, all the arguments of the American anti-
communism of the 1950s: socialist [read ‘radical’,  ‘leftist’  or ‘progressive’]
regimes are loathsome despotisms and bloody dictatorships. At the level of
the  state,  this  socialist  ‘totalitarianism’  must  be  contrasted  with
representative democracy, which, while it is of course imperfect, is by far the
least bad form of government… Because it has ended in failure all over the
world, the communist hypothesis is a criminal utopia that must give way to a
culture of ‘human rights’… the cult of freedom (including, of course, freedom
of  enterprise,  the  freedom to own property and to grow rich that  is  the
material guarantee of all other freedoms)’ (2010: 1-2)
It is also an impasse that has affected our lives much more over the last few years
as some of the veneer of success that served to legitimate neoliberal capitalism
has  been  stripped  away  by  internal  instabilities  and  subsequent  political
attempts to shore up its foundations.  Over the last few decades,  however,  the
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notional supremacy of liberal capital  has become more than just  an article of
faith  expressed  by  various  economists,  ideologues  and  politicians.  Apparent
success  transformed  emergent  neoliberalism  into  a  full-blown  millenarian
ideology ripe for global exportation. Gray notes that ‘purged of the doubts that
haunted its classical exponents, the belief in the market as a divine ordinance
became a secular ideology of universal progress that in the late twentieth century
was  embraced  by  international  institutions’  (2007:  105).  Such  millenarian
liberalism became the latest expression of the enlightenment faith that we are
evolving toward a universal civilization. In this vein, recent decades have been
dominated by confident expectation that liberal democracy will, at some point in
the future, ascend to power in every corner of the globe. More importantly, the
activities  of  western-dominated  international  institutions  (the  IMF,  the  World
Bank, the UN and NATO, for instance) could help turn aspiration into concrete
political reality and should institute policies toward such ends. 
The boost given this (re-)emergent ideology by the end of the Cold War seems to
have led Anglo-American leaders to the possibility that domestic success could
be  replicated  elsewhere.  It  seems  that  ‘led  by  [Margaret]  Thatcher,  western
governments told the countries of the former Soviet block that if  they wanted
prosperity they had to import the free market’ (Ibid. 117). The notion that the
same  policies  that  pulled  the  Anglophone  economies  out  of  the  nineteen-
seventies stagnatory mire could be replicated in other contexts quickly became a
truism of twentieth century politics.  A new breed of economists,  the ‘Chicago
boys’, set about exporting liberal economics to South America, while the IMF and
World Bank did their part through structural  adjustment conditions requiring
economic liberalization as a pre-requisite of international aid. 
Many of the world’s developed nations entered the twenty-first century playing
host to a millenarian political order that they actively aspired to export around
the globe. This core proposition of western ideological faith still seems to form a
substantial part of the operating principles of international institutions despite a
number  of  historical  refutations.  The  fall  of  Soviet  Communism  in  1990  was
taken as a sign that all states within its zone of influence would adopt western-
style  liberal  democracy  and  the  free  market.  However,  as  a  consequence  of
attempts to install free market liberalism, post-communist Russia  ‘produced… a
species of  mafia-dominated anarcho-capitalism’  (Gray,  2002: 133) that further
impoverished  the  Russian  people  and  perhaps  pushed  them  toward  the
autocratic leadership of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. In much the same
vein, various South American peoples continue to display a marked fondness for
popular leftist regimes (such as those led by Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales and Raul
Castro) after their fateful experiences with US-orchestrated liberalism during the
last century.  Yet, as events abroad appear to challenge the neoliberal version of
history it only seems to be asserted with more vigor.  The terrorist attacks on
London and New York in the last decade, for instance, were not taken as signs of
an  increasingly  frustrated  world  at  odds  with  the  international  conduct  of
neoliberalism but of the necessity for a generational ‘war on terror’  to rescue
foreign peoples from their own inadequacies. 
What  we have perhaps seen emerge during recent decades is  a  new political
monad  that  conceives  of  its  own existence  as  the  triumph of  human history.
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Neoliberalism has arguably become a subject of ‘universal notions that do not
just  describe  ‘how  things  are’  [in  our  particular  socio-historical  context]  but
serve to prescribe and insist  that  this is ‘how things must be’  [in all  possible
contexts  and  futures]’  (Williams,  2011:  5).  In  other  words,  it  seems  to  have
become  a  new  object  for  the  enlightenment  faith  in  historical  progress  –  a
‘universality’ that appears to be ‘the only game in town’ (Žižek, 2000: 95). In the
coming pages, I want to explore the sociological response to this growing sense
of political certainty. How did sociological intellectuals react to neoliberalism’s
claims  to  represent  some  form  of  historical  truth,  the  end  point  in  a
developmental process that was always heading this direction? 
Relativising the Universal
Based on the first section of this essay we might be reminded of an observation
common amongst leftist philosophers such as Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek,
that it is now ‘easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism’.
Certainly we might observe that while alternative socio-political narratives ‘no
longer exists as a coherent programme of government’ (Cohen, 2007: 11) much
of our media and scientific output consists of apocalyptic scenarios and doom-
laden assessments of various ‘risks’. From science fiction’s obsession with post-
apocalyptic landscapes and zombie plagues to the predictions of rising sea levels,
desertification,  resource wars and population crashes associated with modern
climate science (see,  for instance, Lovelock,  2009; Vince, 2009; Dyer, 2010),  it
remains difficult to escape the notion that society genuinely could come crashing
down. Equally, however, we are also faced with the possibility that neoliberalism
‘seamlessly occupies the horizon of the thinkable’ (Fisher, 2009: 8) to such an
extent  that  it  seems certain to  see us  all  out.  Faced with such overwhelming
conviction  from  a  political  order  quite  as  problematic  as  millenarian
neoliberalism we might be forgiven for enquiring after competing conceptions of
the social good. 
Of  course  practical  alternate  visions  of  how  society  should  work  do  not
spontaneously erupt from nothing but are often the product of ‘intellectuals’ with
the  time  and  inclination  for  patient  analysis  and  deep  thought.  Thus  we
concentrate our efforts on those who might claim a measure of intellectualism.
To  the  extent  that  intellectuals  have  been  responsible  for  establishing  an
‘atmosphere  of  hostility  to  capitalism’  (Schumpeter,  1942:  145)  we  should
probably acknowledge that their relationship with seats of power has often been
a little fraught. From Galileo and Marx through to the modern day, intellectuals
have  often  stood  in  opposition  to  accepted  dogmas  and  taken-for-granted
assumptions, pursuing instead what they individually perceived to be ‘the truth’.
What’s more, we might note that sociology, at least as much as any other social
science discipline,  has its roots in and perhaps owes many of its successes to
various creeds of radical intellectualism. According to the late Eric Hobsbawm,
for instance, the history of sociology remains inextricable from Marxism:
‘From  the  late  19th century on,  sociology,  the  attempt  to  understand the
operations of society, overlapped with both Marx and the more general aim
7
of  changing  and  not  merely  interpreting  the  world…  The  extraordinary
expansion  of  higher  education  since  the  1960s  had  given  it  [sociology]
unusual prominence… and political radicalisation had made it a subject of
choice for many students’ (2011: 390). 
More than that, however, many late-twentieth century sociologists asserted that
being ‘an intellectual’  involves extending expertise into the political realm and
applying  it  to  the  creation  of  a  society  that  better  fulfils  the  needs  and
requirements of its population (see Bauman, 1987; Bourdieu, 1988, for example).
This function we supposedly perform by being more concerned with ultimate
values (truth,  justice and decency) and raising uncomfortable questions about
prevailing beliefs and customs. According to Frank Furedi, ‘being an intellectual
implies social engagement… It involves… the assumption of social responsibility
and taking a political stand’ (2004: 35). 
In essence, the social function of intellectualism might seem to involve holding to
the  possibility  of  solving  social  problems  through  the  mutability  of  social
structures and their governing ideas. If this is a fair description of what it means
to be involved in  an intellectual  enterprise  then it  would seem to be directly
inimical to any system of thought that holds existing structures to be immutable,
such as that outlined above. In this context, the question crucial to our ongoing
analysis is what the affect of millenarian liberalism’s ideological monism might
have been on such an avowedly critical  enterprise determined to maintain its
distance from seats of power and, ostensibly,  at least,  associated with various
forms of radicalism (it is perhaps worth mentioning that this does not just mean
those working on ‘the  left’.  Under neoliberal  universality traditional  one-state
conservatism may be just as ‘radical’ as any collectivist alternative)?
Might some disavow their  earlier convictions as impractical  youthful  idealism
and drift perceptibly toward millenarian neoliberalism? Might others cling on for
dear life, holding to the radical promise despite looking increasingly out of touch?
In others:
[T]he  radical  impulse  would  persist,  but  would  be  forced  to  migrate
elsewhere.  The  governing  assumptions  of  such  an  epoch,  one  imagines,
would be that the system itself was unbreachable; and a great many radical
positions…  could  be  seen  to  flow  from  this  gloomy  presupposition.  One
might expect, for example, that there would be an upsurge in interest in the
crevices and margins of  the system – in those ambiguous,  indeterminate
spots where its power seems less implacable (Eagleton, 1996: 2)
Yet following from the image of the traditional, politically engaged intellectual we
might also expect a profusion of wide-ranging research on the many downsides
of millenarian liberalism, motivated by various ideals and commitments to the
mutability of social structures. In truth, there are many examples of all of these
different  possibilities,  be  it  sociology’s  multifaceted  engagement  with
consumerism  or  a  generally  fairly  suspicious  take  on  the  culture  that  has
developed  alongside  neoliberal  capitalism (see,  for  instance,  Hall  et  al,  2008;
MacDonald, 2009; Hall, 2012). However, such qualification must be met with the
possibility that concurrent developments on the other side of the political fence
might appear to favor only one of these possibilities. 
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As  neoliberalism  began  to  move  back  toward  the  political  mainstream,  the
collectivist successes of post-war social democracy (less social inequality, relative
prosperity and rapid technological advancement, for example) radically altered
the constituency of the democratic left. ‘Hard graft in traditional factories, mines
and transport industries was giving way to automation, the rise of the service
industries  and  an  increasingly  feminized  labor  force’  (Judt,  2010:  86).  These
transformations,  further  spurred  by  nineteen-seventies  economic  stagnation,
gave  the  ‘old  left’  a  dwindling  constituency  less  able  to  count  on  the  loose
collectivism of traditional working class communities. In their place came a new
generation born into an era of  relative  prosperity and significant  movements
toward  social  justice.  Where  the  ‘old  left’  had  accepted  intrusive  top-down
legislation as the necessary price of social justice and economic security, the ‘new
left’  was  far  more  at  home  to  disenchantment  with  political  institutions,
differentiation and demands for the state to respect individualized ‘rights’. 
Fairly hesitantly at first, the nineteen-seventies and even more so the nineteen-
eighties  would  see  the  left  move  away  from  engaging  an  increasingly
universalistic version of neoliberal capitalism by holding to competing political
narratives.  Instead,  the  left  took  to  questioning  the  claims  of  universalism at
every  turn  by  adopting  a  philosophical  posture  that  celebrated  diversity  and
opposed universalistic values wherever they might rear their head. According to
Furedi, this program drew much of its inspiration from universalizing capital –
‘because  western  capitalism  presented  its  values  as  universal,  the  new  left
unthinkingly became opposed to it [universality]’ (2004: 61). 
What we saw emerging was a ‘cultural turn’ toward ‘particularism, heterogeneity
and difference’ that grounded its interpretations of everyday life in the language
of  relativism and relativistic  conceptions  of  individual  behaviour.  Boudon,  for
instance, has noted that an emergent relativism (the perspective that values and
ideas  have  no  objectivity,  or,  more  importantly,  that  they  are  fundamentally
subjective and relate only to those holding them) may be a candidate for a new
‘secular  religion’  in  which  we  ‘tend  to  see  all  norms  through  ‘culturalist’
spectacles:  each  ‘culture’  has  its  own  norms  and  values’  (2004:  3).  Such
observations flow from the objective fact of human diversity – there are many
moralities,  many ways of seeing the world and of behaving within it  and that
these  differ  both  between and  within  cultures.  Yet  the  truly  ‘relativistic  turn
comes when you transfer these perspectives into the first-person perspective of a
moral agent… and you conclude that there is  no one true morality but many’
(Lukes, 2008: 115). 
In  more  sociological  terms,  the  emergence  of  such  a  relativistic  approach  to
social phenomena refers to ‘adopting a particularistic worldview linked to the
politics of identity’ (Furedi, 2004: 61). This particularism might then hold to the
possibility that individuals living in a universalistic neoliberal society would find
their  own  way  to  resist  its  dominance  through  individualized  forms  of  self-
expression without recourse to the realm of universalistic ideas, metanarratives
and macro-processes. Hence,  their perspective would be ‘culturally relative’  to
beliefs held in isolation and would allow such individuals to hold out against a
universalistic conception of the social good. In such circumstances we might see
a  profusion  of  sociological  research  that  expressed  ‘enthusiasm  for  diversity,
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multiplicity, and the agency of consumers actively transforming their lifestyles’
(Dean, 2009: 9) and the development of an ‘intense sense of cynicism toward
causes  and ideas’  (Furedi,  2004:  74)  that  arguably  amounts  to  a  rejection  of
socio-political mutability’s revolutionary promise.
Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  given  British  sociology’s  roots  in  the  left-of-centre
discourses  of  the  latter  half  of  last  century,  much  of  this  new  philosophical
orientation  seems  to  have  been  adopted  in  one  form  or  another.  Rojek  and
Turner, for instance, observe that ‘decorative sociology’ (a tendency to focus on
culture  and  its  interpretation  with  a  habit  of  reading  politics  into  cultural
activities) ‘has taken root with such tenacity that it is now the most powerful
tendency in critical  cultural  studies and cultural sociology’  (2000: 639).  More
than anything else this appears to have involved an orientation toward social
theory  in  which  macro-interpretations  of  social  phenomena  as  the  result  of
broad processes felt across social structures are pushed to the sidelines while
individualized local images of diversity are foregrounded. In other words, ‘Large
claims about macro-processes – modernization, secularization, rationalization –
are  viewed  by  [sic]  skepticism,  while  arguments  that  favor  local  images  of
postmodern  society  as  a  fragmented  and  diverse  social  reality  are  readily
accepted’ (Boudon, 2004: vi). 
Most  importantly,  however,  the  over-riding  assertion  appears  to  be  that  no
matter the claims of a singular historical universality it all comes to naught when
faced with the multitudinous interpretations of  individuals  making their  own
way in a fragmented and diverse social reality. Some of the most prominent facets
of  modern  sociology  appear  to  flow  from  this  relative  diminution  of  macro-
processes  in  favor  of  a  micro-sociology that  studies  the  social  world in  ever-
smaller discreet units. On one hand, for instance, we seem to have developed a
marked  fondness  for  methodological  complexity,  empiricism  and  claims  to
objectivity that mirror aspects of the natural sciences, while on the other we have
the  emergence  of  concepts  such  as  ‘identity  politics’  (also  known  as  ‘life’  or
‘lifestyle’  politics)  that  might  seem  to  privilege  the  individual  over  macro-
processes.  While  we  are  sadly  lacking  the  space  for  full  analysis  of  such
expressions of this new philosophical orientation the latter is perhaps worth a
little more detail.
Identity  politics  ‘concerns  political  issues,  which flow from processes  of  self-
actualization in post-traditional  contexts,  where globalizing influences intrude
deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of
self-realization  influence  global  strategies’  (Giddens,  1991:  214).  These  ‘life
politics’ provide a basis on which to claim that individual behaviour in almost
any  area  of  social  life  can  be  ‘political’,  harboring  each  individual  citizens’
approval  and/or  disapproval,  consent  and/or  rejection,  of  large-scale  social
structures  and  the  powers  that  be.  In  other  words,  the  Foucauldian
determination that there is no such thing as ‘universal truth’, that metanarratives
should  be  met  with  skepticism  and  suspicion,  appears  to  have  been
supplemented with the far more optimistic possibility that individuals construct
‘truths’ of their own in the face of neoliberal universality and that these relative
micro-conceptions of the world provide a refuge for ‘free thought’, dissent and
political expression to the extent that all sociology needs to do is document them.
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At its extreme, groups of academics dedicated their careers to rooting out hidden
subversive meanings in pop lyrics with Madonna’s career a popular choice (see,
for example, Schwichtenberg, 1993; Robertson, 1996) or analyzing the cultural
subtexts of American teen dramas such as Dawson’s Creek or Buffy the Vampire
Slayer, the latter spawning ‘buffyology’ within the academy (see Badman, 2002
for an extensive list of academic work on the subject). More generally, clothing
styles,  music  genres,  shopping habits  and film were all  analyzed for  sub rosa
political implications (see Philo & Miller, 2001 for a useful summary) as we cast
around  looking  for  signs  of  life  in  the  barren  wastelands  of  neoliberal
universality. 
At this point it  is probably worth reiterating that this is not the only trend in
evidence in sociological theory. Many alternate strands are immediately apparent
with  only  the  most  cursory  glance  at  the  literature  available  to  cultural
sociologists.  For  every vaguely  hagiographic  text  on the political  meanings  of
various consumer proclivities there is another portraying the same activities as
anxious, defensive reactions to an increasingly insecure culture. For every work
seemingly convinced that we live in an increasingly free and prosperous society
there is another arguing the same conditions to be signs of yet greater alienation
and exploitation. In fact,  ‘The critique of alienation and spectacle has blossomed
and spread to the point it has become the most common vulgate because it is the
only discourse of consolation that we have’ (Baudrillard, 2010: 41).
Nevertheless, to the extent that ‘the cultural turn’ and the implications of cultural
relativism still  form one of the main currents of sociological theory, we might
note that it seems to be the product of a radical intelligentsia lacking an object
capable of validating their commitment to a better, more egalitarian world.  The
outcome, however, seems to have been to:
unambiguously  reformulate  the  relationship  between  social  science  and
social  critique:  the social  sciences were no longer  expected to perform a
critical  function;  they  expelled  critique  beyond  their  own  boundaries,
turning it into nothing but a subject of study. The task from now on would be
to  study  the  critical  potential  of  intersubjective  communication…  or  the
different  regimes  of  justification  and  critique  used  by  actors  in  their
everyday practices. In this way the social sciences followed the spirit of the
times: in a spirit of universal democratization and liberalization, they gave
up  their  critical  privileges  and  delegated  them  to  citizens  themselves
(Znepolski, 2010: 2-3)
In  other  words,  the  direction  taken  by  parts  of  the  intellectual  left  after  the
cultural turn might seem to have delegated many of our critical responsibilities
to individuals just going about their day-to-day lives. More than that, however,
there remains a possibility that the tendency to focus our energies on elucidating
individual  experiences  draws  much  of  its  inspiration  from  the  universalizing
spirit of capitalism that took hold during the nineteen-eighties. Obvious public
success,  apparent superiority to other socio-political  discourses and emergent
universal  status  seem  to  have  dealt  a  blow  to  the  interests  of  the  radical
intelligentsia that left us scrambling to find alternative ways to express dissent.
However, instead of revitalizing intellectualism’s critical inclinations for an era of
totalitarian liberalism,  we seemed to set  about studying the forms of critique
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built  into the everyday activities of  ordinary people.  This is  an approach that
might  appear  to  have  a  great  deal  in  common  with  Terry  Eagleton’s  (1996)
‘gloomy presupposition’.
What the recent history of our discipline perhaps indicates is that we may have
fallen foul of the same problems that have plagued almost every quarter of the
intellectual left for the last few decades.  Rather than oppose neoliberalism on its
own terms, perhaps with an equally compelling universality of our own, we seem
to have retreated down the rabbit hole of individual critical potential, delegating
some of our intellectual responsibilities to everyday citizens, most of whom are
preoccupied with just trying to get by in an increasingly inhospitable world. 
Insofar  as  too  many  on  the  academic  and  typing  left  have  celebrated
isolation  as  freedom  and  consumption  as  creativity,  we  have  failed  to
counter the neoliberalisation of the economy. Even worse – we have failed to
provide good reasons to support  collective  approaches to political,  social
and economic  problems…  We gave  in,  gave  up,  before  we  needed  to.  We
actually didn’t lose. It’s worse than that. We quit [Original emphasis] (Dean,
2009: 4-5)
Ultimately, we may be looking at a causal relationship between the emergence of
neoliberal universality and the subsequent character of much sociological theory.
Faced  with  an  apparently  incontestable,  unassailably  popular  socio-historical
narrative it seems as though academic sociology was all but forced to abandon its
relationship  with radical  social  ideals  and the possibility  of  building  a  better
world through mass political mobilization. In a world that apparently believed it
had solved all the biggest philosophical questions of human existence, sociology
seems to have adopted a new political disposition that re-forged the discipline in
line with the conditions of emergent universality. In other words, late-twentieth
century sociology’s renewed focus on the individual over and above macro-level
social analysis allowed it to live on in a world system that apparently believed
there was nothing to be gained in challenging the currently dominant ‘master
pattern’.  However,  in  promulgating  ideas  such  as  identity  politics,  in  getting
involved with ‘subcultures’  –  by  definition marginally  different  cultural  forms
existing within an over-riding narrative  – sociology appears  to have accepted
neoliberalism as a fait accompli and moved the discipline away from its roots in
strident social critique. 
Instead  of  meeting  neoliberal  universality  head  on  and  challenging  it  with
alternative  ideals,  sociology set  about  relativizing universality,  trying  to  show
how it  did not  necessarily  entail  homogeneity,  that  even within conditions of
ideological monism we might still find groups that differ, often in very marginal,
unimportant and distinctly uninteresting ways, from dominant social ideals. In
other words, going to great lengths to show that universality remains relative
only to those who subscribe to its belief system and that critique can dynamically
emerge from within such a monopolar political form. The problem we face is that
as  neoliberal  universality  has  become  increasingly  troublesome,  sociology
appears  to  have  moved  away  from  the  possibility  of  solving  said  problems
through the mutability of macro-processes and structures leaving us struggling
to participate in the growing debate around the future direction of our society in
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the wake of the financial  crisis.  Sociology,  we might suggest,  has transformed
itself  into  a  deeply  unthreatening,  vaguely  liberal  enterprise  with  little  to
contribute when it comes to the apparent decay of the liberal order. 
Conclusion (What is to be done?)
This  paper  set  out  to  explore  a  putative  relationship  between  the  emergent
philosophical concept of neoliberal universalism and recent directions taken by
social theory. The last decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a
remarkable consensus around the social,  political  and economic legitimacy of
neoliberalism.  Slowly  but  surely  the  fundamental  ideological  oppositions  that
typified  the  middle  decades  of  the  twentieth  century  (see  Hobsbawm,  1995;
Badiou, 2007) fell away, replaced by a political monad that seemingly believed we
had found  a  final  solution to  the  great  ethical  problems  of  human history.  It
seemed that longstanding questions such as how we should live and what makes
a  ‘good’  society  had  been  answered  by  the  return  of  the  free  market  and
neoliberalism’s ascent to political  dominance.  Now the business of politics lay
only in neoliberalism’s preservation. Any attempt to radically improve our social
conditions, was believed to be the product of hopeless romanticism and perhaps
even a dangerous risk likely to open the door for despotic government.
What’s more,  this determination has arguably produced a number of stagnant
societies in which a host of worsening social problems – not least of which is the
financial crises of the last few years – never seem to effect change in any of the
underlying coordinates of our social existence, such as unfettered markets and
‘free trade’. In this way we might be reminded of Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005)
description of a society in which a booming, profoundly restructured capitalism
breezily co-exists with social deterioration and rampant inequality whilst facing
little in the way of real political opposition. Neoliberalism has, despite its many
problems, become the single viable socio-historical narrative that explains how
human  society  as  a  whole  could  and  should  work.  It  is,  by  all  accounts,  a
universality that has become ‘the only game in town’.
In  this  context  we  enquire  after  traditional  sources  of  competing  narratives,
particularly sociological intellectuals and their longstanding affinity for political
critique.  What  we perhaps find,  however,  is  a  discipline  that  appears to have
delegated many of its critical responsibilities in a spirit of universal liberalization,
expelling (political) critique outward to citizens themselves then setting about
documenting their individual responses to an increasingly inhospitable society.
Instead of devoting critical attention to neoliberal universality large sections of
leftist sociology, particularly cultural sociology, have discovered an infinite source
of diversity, multiplicity and agency in which individuals have gained the means
and  scope  to  transform  their  lives  in  fluid  and  dynamic  ways  while  not
challenging the basic co-ordinates of our social  existence.  This failure to meet
neoliberalism head on arguably amounts to an intellectual retreat that opened
the door for the re-adoption of classical liberalism on the socio-economic stage.
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What’s  more,  the  rise  of  neo-capitalist  universality  and  the  allied  process  of
intellectual retreat are, perhaps, the final sum of the Chancellor’s harried flight
home  and  the  mass  bailout  of  the  financial  sector  hurriedly  finalized  on  his
return. That we found ourselves in a situation where the only viable course of
action barring wholesale economic collapse was to transfer billions of pounds of
public  money  into  private  coffers  for  the  express  purpose  of  keeping  our
economy  afloat  must  be  indicative  of  a  deeply  imbalanced  society.  That  the
bailout attracted broad public support from the general population (Žižek, 2010)
or that little progress has since been made in legislating away the worst excesses
of financial markets further indicates the deep-seated malaise that seems to have
overtaken traditional political bipolarity. 
Once again,  we are faced with the conclusion that neoliberalism ‘occupies the
horizon of the thinkable’ (Fisher, 2009: 8) to such an extent that we couldn’t see
anything out the other side but the abject misery of complete socio-economic
shutdown.  In  this  vein,  perhaps  sociology,  instead  of  doggedly  pursuing
individual critical potential, could take a role for itself amongst those trying to
shed some light on the system we are in now and what we might find out the
other side. Jean Baechler (2007) has noted that sociology has always been closer
in its approach to disciplines such as philosophy and history than the natural
sciences, in which case we might take a lead from those trying to turn critical
philosophy to meeting our circumstances head on.  Alain Badiou,  for instance,
recently proposed a triumvirate function for his discipline that would allow it to
‘think the transformation of life’: 
First,  to  throw  light  on  the  fundamental  choices  of  thought.  ‘In  the  last
instance’… such choices are always between what is interested and what is
disinterested.
Second, to throw light on the distance between thinking and power, between
truths and the state. To measure this distance. To know whether or not it can
be crossed.
Third, to throw light on the value of exception. The value of the event. The
value of the break. And to do this against the continuity of life, against social
conservatism (2009: 12).
While  not  wanting  to  step  on  his  toes,  there  is  no  discernible  reason  why
sociologists could not put more effort into highlighting the distance between any
conception of an ethical society and its current form, then set about illustrating
just how valuable a radical break could be. 
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